



UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS
General Certificate of Education
Advanced Subsidiary Level and Advanced Level

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HISTORY

9697/31

Paper 3 International History, 1945–1991

May/June 2012

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

You may use a soft pencil for any rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **three** questions.

You must **not** answer both Question 3 and Question 4.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.



This document consists of **4** printed pages.



Section A: The Development of the United Nations, 1945–1991

You **must** answer Question 1.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND STALIN'S SOVIET UNION

- 1 Read the Sources and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

In the future, peace-loving nations may once more find themselves caught off their guard by aggression unless, of course, they work out special measures right now which can avert it. There is only one means to this end: that is to establish a special organisation made up of representatives of the peace-loving nations for the defence of peace and safeguarding of security. This must not be a repetition of the sad memory of the League of Nations, which had neither the right nor the means to avert aggression. It will be a new, special, fully authorised international organisation having at its command everything necessary to defend peace and avert new aggression. Can we expect the actions of this world organisation to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the Great Powers continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated.

From a speech made by Stalin at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet, November 1944.

Source B

When we look at the record of the Soviet Union in the UN, we see a striking contrast between word and deed, between Communist ideology and Charter principle. Outwardly, the Soviet Union has found it convenient to support the UN. In 1947, for example, Andre Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, said 'The policy of the USSR calls for strengthening the UN, extending and reinforcing international cooperation, unfaltering and consistent observance of the Charter and the implementation of its principles.' The Soviets have hardly lived up to these fine words. The communist ideology that the Soviet Union brought with it into the UN has made it difficult, if not impossible, to accept the full obligations of membership. It is hard to escape the conclusion that there is a fundamental contradiction between traditional Communist doctrine and the principles of the UN Charter. Communist doctrine looks forward to a monolithic world of Communist states. The UN Charter looks forward to a world of diversity, where each country can develop differently in accordance with the different characteristics and aspirations of its people.

From an article entitled 'The Soviet Union and the UN', by an American academic, 1964.

Source C

There is no doubt in my mind that the UN granted to the Soviet Union the kind of legitimacy that it could never have acquired through the conduct of its leadership, and enabled it to play a role on the world stage that it could not have played on the strength of its own miserable achievements. The Soviet Union used the UN and its institutions as a front. It did not value the UN for its peacekeeping function, but, on the contrary, recognised it only as a way to neutralise Western defences and confer retrospective legitimacy on its own colonial ventures. In short, in the Soviet view, the UN was an essential component of diplomacy as war by other means.

Source D

Initially, Stalin and the other Soviet leaders were not enthusiastic about the UN. Stalin was concerned that the Western powers would work in harmony against the Soviet Union. The Soviets came to realise that the UN offered the opportunity to enhance the Soviet Union's prestige as a great power. The Soviets believed that the UN should be limited to maintaining peace and opposed the idea of granting power to the UN to resolve economic, cultural or humanitarian issues. And they worked to consolidate as much authority as possible to the Security Council where they held a veto. The Soviets soon came to use the UN as an arena to combat 'anti-Soviet' measures. By the autumn of 1947, the Soviets had cast 17 of the 18 vetoes issued in the Security Council. The frequent vetoes led to growing disappointment within the Kremlin over the UN. They were concerned that the USA and the United Kingdom could force a veto after a veto from the Soviet Union, and thereby damage its international standing. The Security Council, which had been conceived as an arena of cooperation, had evolved into an arena of confrontation and ideology.

From a lecture delivered by a Russian academic at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington, USA, 2006.

Source E

New evidence released from Russian archives since the end of the Cold War shows that Stalin was completely sincere in his commitment to a peacetime Grand Alliance with Britain and the USA. He saw this alliance as a safeguard against a revival of the German and Japanese threats. Stalin's support for a peacetime Grand Alliance was, like Roosevelt's, self-interest. Stalin had no intention of sacrificing vital Soviet interests and his price for long-term collaboration with the capitalist world would be a high one. Stalin was an enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt's idea that the UN could provide a framework from within which the Great Powers would police the new world order. But Stalin insisted that all the Great Powers should have the right to veto UN action on peace and security matters and thereby be able to protect their own interests.

From an article by a British historian, 2007.

Now answer the following question.

How far do Sources A–E support the view that Stalin's Soviet Union was never truly committed to the United Nations?

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

You must **not** answer both Question 3 and Question 4.

- 2 'The Cold War developed in Europe between 1945 and 1949 because the USA and the USSR had different political ideologies.' How far do you agree?
- 3 To what extent was the Soviet Union responsible for the globalisation of the Cold War in the years from 1950 to 1975?

OR

- 4 Explain who was more successful in achieving his goals in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962: Kennedy or Khrushchev.
- 5 How important was the USA in the collapse of the USSR by 1991?
- 6 'Attempts to control the nuclear arms race between the superpowers in the period from 1949 to 1980 were largely successful.' How far do you agree?
- 7 How far do you support the view that American dominance of the international economy had ended by the 1980s?
- 8 'An attempt to challenge the dominance of the USA and the USSR.' How adequate is this as an explanation of the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement?

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